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Is Independence an Extinct Virtue on Boards?
By Andres C. Salazar
University of New Mexico
Nontraditional financial reporting at Enron, excessive executive compensation at Tyco
and numerous other questionable practices at public companies have captured news
headlines in recent weeks. Debate continues as to why these revelations have emerged
now, given that these practices no doubt have been going on for some time. It is not
surprising that public confidence has eroded on voluntary disclosure of such actions by
corporate boards. Further, has there not been a move afoot for several years to give
greater voice to independent directors on a public company’s board?
Exactly, what is an independent board member or director?
Every member of the board of directors of a public company, according to common
corporate bylaws, has the fiduciary responsibility of providing impartial and diligent
oversight of a company’s operation and management in the interest of all shareholders.
However, for quite some time, boards of directors at public companies were often found
stacked with employees, investors with large stock holdings, “trophy” or “big name”
directors, and “buddies” of the CEO who brought little business expertise, and more
importantly, brought no unbiased eye to the board. In response to complaints from
shareholders about boards that appeared to be unresponsive to their interests, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as early as 1940, asked public companies to
take on “independent” board members on audit committees. More recently, the SEC
issued Rule RIN 3235-AH83, made effective on January 31, 2000, that asked for
disclosure via proxy statements from public companies about the independence of
directors on audit committees. An independent board member was supposed to be a
recognized business executive with knowledge or expertise relevant to the public
company business, with no sizable share holdings in the company stock, not an
employee, supplier or customer and with no significant affiliation with the company’s
management or operations. The expectation was that this “outsider” could review the
company’s policy, finances and strategy and cast votes in the best interests of the
shareholders at large.
Despite this SEC noble mission, “stacked” boards still appear to be plentiful. The
partnerships used for hiding losses at Enron, the lucrative executive compensation or
“loan agreements” at Worldcom or Tyco are items that are normally reviewed and
approved at the board level. Were the independent board members asleep? Unlikely.
What probably happened was that persuasive arguments by more influential “insider”
board members drove the approval of the resolutions allowing such reprehensible and
unethical acts to occur. The reason we are learning about these actions now is timing. The
market has had a severe downturn, significantly affecting the wealth of a great many
Americans who had become shareholders in the “boom” nineties. They want answers and
in some cases, retribution.
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The negative publicity attributed to boards abdicating their fiduciary responsibility could
now make it more difficult to get “quality” independent board candidates to join boards.
It simply is not worth the aggravation or risk to be a minority member of a board that is
already “stacked.” No compensation at the board member level, (normally a few
thousand dollars plus some company shares per year is typical), can possibly offset the
risk to one’s reputation and career.
The current public outrage, however well justified, at the shenanigans occurring at public
companies could very well have an outcome that would make matters worse. Namely, we
could witness a deeper entrenchment of insiders on boards along with the reluctance of
business leaders with integrity and honesty to join boards of public companies.
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